Archive for February, 2007


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Best Ideas Hedge FOF

Tuesday, February 27th, 2007


I have examined a few different ways of cobbling together portfolios from hedge fund 13Fs:

1. Consensus – Putting together a portfolio of names that are owned by multiple funds.
2. Replication – Replicating a single fund with its top 10 holdings.
3. Conviction – The Morgan Stanley study that bought companies with a high %age of their shares owned by a small number of hedge funds.

Granted, there is *very likely* survivorship bias due to the universe of funds currently in existence. How much this biases the results it is hard to gauge. Possibly the returns will settle closer to the HFR L/S category average, but I think the best value managers will achieve returns that outpace that.

One of the problems I had with my Consensus portfolio was the idea of herding. Just because a number of funds own a stock does not necessarily mean it is their best idea. . .

I went back and examined what a “Best Ideas” Portfolio would look like. In this case I simply took the top 2 holdings from 9 value hedge funds, and updated it quarterly. The results are below.

They are highly correlated with the Consensus Portfolio ( ~ .85), but less volatile, and with slightly better returns. This strategy makes more intuitive sense to me than the Consensus.

A current portfolio we will track on Stockpickr could include these stocks from the following funds:

Other funds that readers submitted that could be included are:

Gotham
Glenview
Alson
Pabrai
Perry
Lone Pine
Tontine
Relational
Defiance
Appaloosa
Thames
Witmer
Libra
Feinberg
MLF

Got That Sinking Feeling?

Tuesday, February 27th, 2007

The equity markets took a big whoosh down today, and many other asset classes suffered as well:

That’s what market pundits talk about when they say that all correlations go to 1 when the market is declining. Bonds were up on the day, but that’s not much solace when your equity funds are down 4%. As taken up by Nelson Freeburg in the recent issue of Formula Research, most of the risk in a typical 60/40 allocation is concentrated in equity risk. Not just 60%, but closer to 90%. What is an investor to do when structuring optimal portfolios? Risk-parity is a topic I am very interested in, and one of the reasons I originally started writing on this blog. My very first post linked to risk parity discussions from the best of the best institutional managers. (Highly recommended reading).

A quick summary – there is no reason to accept asset classes pre-packaged the way they come now – ie 100% long. An investor can either lever up or down his exposure to an asset class (many confuse risk with leverage) to achieve desired levels of risk and return. An investor could place more in bonds (or other low vol instruments like some hedge funds) and then leverage up the entire portfolio – resulting in a superior allocation than the previous portfolio.

The Bridgewater has two charts that include risk and return expectations from a Rocaton study. The first has the expected return/risk levels for various asset classes:

The second has the same asset classes (de)leveraged to the same expected return:

Confusing? Yes, but take a look a the previous links for a much more thorough discussion of the topic. A better allocation than the simple 20% equal weighted in my example would be to leverage up the bonds to 40-60% while keeping the other asset classes at 20%. . .But I want to focus on something else – the Bridgewaters of the world do a better job of explaining the topic than I do.

Many funds have rolled out alternative mutual funds and ETFs recently, and it is instructive to examine how they have performed on this down day. One in particular, the Claymore Sabrient Defender Index (DEF), was designed to “Defend” against down days. The specifics of the methodology are proprietary, but in general terms, the fund is rebalanced quarterly by looking back at the last quarter and seeing what did well on the down days. So how well did it play D today?

An awful -3.00%.

Below is a chart of other funds that track alternative strategies including fund of funds, long/short equity, market neutral, arbitrage, covered calls, convertible bonds, private equity, and currency harvest. All are publicly traded in the US as mutual funds or ETFs.

Most of the funds performed as expected, namely, the lost less $ than the equity indices. There are a couple exceptions. Hussman gets the gold star for the day as the only fund that was up (he has been notably bearish for some time). Geronimo’s Absolute Return FOF mutual fund (GPHIX) lost a staggering -6.2%. They must have a levered exposure to the HFR Indices, otherwise I cannot fathom how they lost that much in a day being an Absolute Return FOF.

The Long Lasting Momentum in Weekly Returns

Monday, February 26th, 2007

Link to this paper is here.

“While prior studies examine the performance of stocks with extreme weekly returns for only a few weeks, which is the duration of the reversal, momentum profits emerge several weeks after an extreme return and persist over the remainderof the year. The momentum that we document easily offsets the brief and initial reversal in returns.”

ABSTRACT

Reversal is the current stylized fact of weekly returns. However, the brief reversal that follows extreme weekly returns is itself followed by an opposing and long lasting stream of continuation in returns. These subsequent momentum profits are strong enough to offset the initial reversal and to produce a significant momentum effect over the full year following portfolio formation. Thus, ex post, extreme weekly returns are not too extreme. Our findings extend to weekly price movements with and without public news. In addition, there is no relation between news uncertainty and the momentum in one-week returns.

Holy Betas!

Monday, February 26th, 2007


Are hedge funds returning great performance, or is it merely an illusion and they’re selling world betas in disguise?

Having examined how the timing model holds up against the Harvard and Yale endowments, how would it compare to the other brightest minds(and highest paid)in the room? In an earlier post, I examined the structure and characteristics of hedge fund databases and indices. Although the study is dated, here is a link that reveals that only 3% of hedge funds are represented in the 5 major databases.

Below, I am going to examine how a simple buy and hold asset allocation(labeled AA) and our timing model compare to the hedge fund indices. With the understanding that the hedge fund indices returns will likely be overstated, I present the year-by-year results of the timing strategy vs. the HFRI and HFR FOF indices (HFR is the longest time series available). For an apples-to-apples comparison, we have omitted any management fees to invest in either the hedge fund indices (index provider fees) or the timing models (ETF, mutual fund fees). Both should be on the order of 20 to 100 basis points.

Interestingly enough, even without making any adjustments for survivorship biases, the buy-and-hold asset allocation is nearly identical to the FOF Index across all measures except for correlation to the S&P 500. The timing model beats both buy-and-hold and the FOF Index with a higher CAGR, and lower volatility, drawdown, and worst year.

The 2X levered model likewise compares very favorably with the HFR Index, with slightly higher CAGR, higher volatility, and lower drawdown. Even more intriguing is that all of the strategies come incredibly close to the same number of positive months

The chart below depicts the equity curves of the two timing models, the two hedge fund indices, and the S&P 500.

The timing models yearly correlations of returns are in the .50-.60 range, while the FOF index is .34, and the HFRI is .63. This makes intuitive sense because the timing model includes the S&P 500 as a 25% component of the portfolio. Removing the S&P 500 and equal-weighting the four remaining indices results in near identical risk and return figures with a drop in correlation to .26. The table below presents this evidence.

The CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Index is asset-weighted, and all funds must have a minimum of $50 million in assets under management, a minimum one-year track record, and current audited financial statements. There are approximately 900 funds in the index, no FOFs are included, and performance is net of all fees.

The Greenwich-Van Global Hedge Fund Index includes approximately 2000 funds that must have a minimum one-year audited track record, open to new investment, a minimum of $20 in assets, and a US dollar share class must be available.

A simple buy-and-hold of diverse asset classes would have produced near identical results as the CSFB/Tremont hedge fund index, although lagging the Van Index in CAGR. The results of the timing model were superior in every measure of risk and return versus the CSFB-TASS Index. The timing model outperformed the Van Index on a risk-adjusted but not on an absolute basis.

Similar performance without all the headaches of wondering if your manager is boarding a plane to Costa Rica with your cash. . .Not to mention lockups, liquidity risk managment, or transparency problems. . .

Example ETFs of asset classes mentioned in the article are:

Just a Thought

Friday, February 23rd, 2007


Out of the 11 guru portfolios on The Kirk Report (Swensen, Stein, etc) not a single one had any allocation to commodities…

Swensen, who places 30% of his endowment in Real Assets, doesn’t recommend it for the retail investor. . .Why not?

Formula Research

Wednesday, February 21st, 2007

Some of my work was featured in the last issue of Formula Research. If you have not heard of this newsletter, it is the only one I subscribe to (long before this issue) and I highly recommend it. Nelson Freeburg does a great job of tackling quant systems, and has been doing so for years. For some historical issues, you can go to Tom McClellan’s (another original writer) site here and here.

A Better Dog

Wednesday, February 21st, 2007


A wonderful paper scheduled for April publication in the Journal of Finance takes a new twist on the Dogs of the Dow strategy. The paper, by Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts is titled, “On the Importance of Payout Yield“. SmartMoney magazine also has a good overview of the paper in their “Stockscreen” column.

In an earlier post we examined a few Dogs of the Dow strategies. One of the problems with the original Dogs strategy (buy the top 10 yielding stocks in the Dow, rebalanced yearly) is that the performance has deteriorated in the past decade or two. Below we will examine this new strategy based on payout yield (and leave a comment if you have a name suggestion for this strategy which I will track on Stockpickr).

Dividends are only one way of returning capital to shareholders. Share repurchases are another such method (see MSFT), and since they are not taxed like dividends, it can be argued they are a more efficient way of returning profits. Buybacks represent about half of all shareholder payouts, and have increased steadily since the early 1980′s. There is a structural reason for this, and is due primarily to the SEC instituting rule 10b-18 in 1982 – providing a safe harbor for firms conducting repurchases from stock manipulation charges. See Grullon and Michaely [2002] for more info on the impact of Rule 10b-18.

The authors examined the payout yield and net payout yield, whose formula is:

Payout Yield = $ spent on dividends + $ spent on share repurchases
(Net payout is simply subtracting the $ raised through new share issues to the above formula)

The authors find that “the widely documented decline in the predictive power of dividends for excess stock returns is due largely to the omission of alternative channels by which firms distribute and receive cash from shareholdlers.” Additionally, while dividend yield has lost its predictive ability over time, the payout yield has remained a robust indicator for excess stock return.

From 1983 – 2003 the various strategies returned:

Dow: 13.4%
DOGS: 16.2%
NPY: 19.1%

The current names will be tracked here:
(in descending order of NPY)

DD
DIS
CAT
MSFT
XOM
PG
INTC
C
MMM
PFE

ABSTRACT

Previous research showed that the dividend yield process changed remarkably during the 1980’s and 1990’s, but that the payout yield (dividends plus repurchases over price) changed very little. As such, we investigate the empirical implications of using various measures of payout yield rather than dividend yield for asset pricing models. We find that the widely documented decline in the predictive power of dividends for excess stock returns is due largely to the omission of alternative channels by which firms distribute and receive cash from shareholders. Statistically and economically significant predictability is found in the time series when payout (dividends plus repurchases) and net payout (dividends plus repurchases minus equity issuances) yields are used instead of dividend yield. In the cross-section, we find that payout yield contains information about expected stock returns exceeding that of dividend yield and that the high minus low payout yield portfolio is a priced factor. Finally, we show that trading on this characteristic leads to excess
profits that can not be explained by the traditional risk factors.

Consensus Portfolio Updates

Tuesday, February 20th, 2007

Here are the updated portfolios for the Hedge Fund Consensus, and Activist Consensus Portfolios. Performance from 12/31/2006 – 2/21/2007 is below:

Hedge: 5.76%
Activist: 2.61%
SP500: 2.72%
Rus2k: 4.79%

AMP was the best HFC stock up 24.29%, and the worst performner was AXP at -3.66%.
AKS was the best AC stock up 26.27%, and the worst performer was SLI at -19.4%.

There was a good article the other day in the NY Times about Hedge Fund Activism, and a new paper titled, “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance.” The article confirms that activists generate statistically significant excess returns.

Barron’s also featured a good overview of San Diego based activist Relational Investors.

On to the portfolios.

HEDGE PORTFOLIO (names in bold are new, names below in italics are removed). UNH is the most often repeated stock (6 times), with QCOM second at 5 times. All the rest are 4 or less.

AAPL
AMP
AMT
AMX
AXP
BRK
CMCSK
FDC
GOOG
MSFT
QCOM
TYC
UNH
WMT
WU

AZO
BBBY

ACTIVIST PORTFOLIO (names in bold are new, names below in italics are removed)

BBI
BGP
DADE
FD
HLT
LCAPA
LGND
LINTA
MCD
MSFT
PDLI
SHLM
SYMC
TNS
TWX
UIC
UNM
WLT
WMB

AKS
FDC
GY
IKN
SHLD
SLI
WU

New Portfolio

Tuesday, February 20th, 2007

In addition to the regular portfolios I track, I am going to add one that updates monthly reflecting the logic from my paper “A Quant Approach to Tactical Asset Allocation.”

I labeled it GTAA (Global Tactical Asset Allocation) and I will update it at Stockpickr here.

Endowment Update

Tuesday, February 20th, 2007

Below is a table constructed from the 2006 Annual Reports from the Harvard and Yale Endowments. Similar in content to my previous post analyzing how a simple buy and hold can replicate the returns of the top endowments, this post focuses on comparing the endowments to the timing strategy mentioned in my paper.

I added a column for the “Average Endowment”. The final numbers are similar to the last update, with the exception being an additional 5% allocation to foreign equities at the expense of bonds. It is interesting to note the very low allocation to bonds by the Yale endowment ( < 4%). I also divided the Real Estate and Commodities evenly, as the report did not break out the %ages for the "Real Assets" category.

Below is the Table comparing the returns from 1983 – year end 2004 for Harvard, buy and hold of the five asset classes evenly weighted (AA), and the Timing strategy on the same asset classes. 40 bps were deducted from the buy and hold and timing ports for ETF/mutual fund fees, which were rebalanced yearly. The Sharpe Ratio is slighly superior to Harvard’s returns.

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